## AVAL MESSAGE

## IND CECRET

# MAVY DEDADTMENT

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FM CINCLANT

TO JCS

JACE, AJCC FT. RITCHIE



// I O P S E C R E T //

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

A. CINCLANT MSG 231406Z AUG 91728/3100 (7009. ) B. CINCLANT MSG 231916Z APR 5/62 (2301261) C. JCS MSG 1081 DTG 092307Z AUG ,

\$1.2 0.012 10000 E&EA K/G

2314062

CONCERNING CONTINED CINCLANT'S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATE CONCERNING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERLIN CRISIS. THE ADDENDUM TO REF A AND DEALS MORE SPECIFICALLY WITH MEA COULD BE TAKEN TO SPEED THE PLANNING PROCESS FOR DEVEL CONTINGENCY PLANS, IMPROVE THE REACTION TIME, AND THERE INCREASE OVER-ALL READINESS FOR BERLIN AND LIMITED WAR WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED AS WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED AS STATE 2. CURRENT CINCLAND. 1. REF A CONTAINED CINCLANT'S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERLIN CRISIS. THIS MSG IS ADDENDUM TO REF A AND DEALS MORE SPECIFICALLY WITH MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO SPEED THE PLANNING PROCESS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS, IMPROVE THE REACTION TIME, AND THEREBY INCREASE OVER-ALL READINESS FOR BERLIN AND LIMITED WAR OPERATIONS WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED AS A RESULT

STATE "2. CURRENT CINCLANT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS HAVE BEEN PREPARED IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNITS WHICH ARE WRITTEN IN THE PLANS. THESE PLANS AS WRITTEN SUFFICE; HOWEVER, CINCLANT BELIEVES THAT THERE IS MUCH ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THEM AND IS DISTRESSED BY THE CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED TO DEVELOP A COMPLETE SET OF PLANS FOR ANY GIVEN

JCS....ACT ION(1-35)

CSA(36-37) CSAF(38-39) CMC(40-47) CNO(48-67)

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#### **NAVAL MESSAGE**

### TOP SECRET

#### NAVY DEPARTMENT

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SITUATION. PART OF THE DIFFICULTY HERE STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT THE ATLANTIC COMMAND, WITHOUT ARMY AND AIRFORCE COMPONENTS, DOES NOT HAVE THE FULL RESOURCES REQUIRED BY A UNIFIED COMMAND. THEREFORE. THE PLANNING AND THE CONDUCT OF JOINT OPERATIONS SUFFERS SOMEWHAT THROUGH LACK OF LIAISON, BUT PRIMARILY THROUGH LACK OF COMMAND AUTHORITY TO GET THINGS DONE QUICKLY. UNTIL THIS AUTHORITY IS ESTA-BLISHED, A UNIFIED COMMANDER MUST RELY ON THE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION OF THE COMMANDERS OF FORCES WHICH HE INTENDS TO EMPLOY IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY WHEN OPERATIONS ARE DIRECTED, THE TRANSITION TO JOINT OPERATIONS WILL BE A SOURCE OF CONFUSION. FOR INSTANCE PRIOR TO OR DURING THE EARLY PHASES OF EXECUTION OF A CONTINGENCY PLAN, A UNIFIED COMMANDER REQUIRES AN AGENCY UNDER HIS COMMAND WHICH WILL SEE TO THE ALERT, ASSEMBLY AND MOVEMENT OF FORCES TO STAGING BASES AND POES. EXPERIENCE DURING THE RECENT ALERT POINTED THIS OUT QUITE CLEARLY. THE COOPERATION RECEIVED ON THIS OCCASION WAS OUTSTANDING

BUT WAS UNDERSTANDABLY AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE COMMANDERS OF SIMETHE FORCES WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY WORKING FOR TWO SEPARATE MILITARY COMMANDERS, THIS DOES NOT OCCUR WHEN COMPONENT, COMMANDS OF ALL CINCLANT REQUESTED ACTIVATION OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMPONENTS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMAND. JCS ACTION ON THIS REQUEST, REF C, WAS UNFA-VORABLE AND APPROVED ONLY DESIGNATION OF INTERIM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

APPOINTMENT OF COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMFANDS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMAND. JCS ACTION ON THIS REQUEST, REF C, WAS VORABLE AND APPROVED ONLY DESIGNATION OF INTERIM COMPONENT COMPONENT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMANDERS; HOWEVER, THEIR DESIGNATIONS OF CINCLANT'S COMPONENT COMMANDERS; HOWEVER, THEIR DESIGNATIONS OF CINCLANT'S COMPONENT COMMAND AND THUS ACTUALLY PERFORM SOFT THE ATLANTIC COMPANDERS. APPOINTMENT OF CG XVIII CORPS AND COM 19TH AF WILL INSURE PLANNING ASSISTANCE BY THOSE COMMANDERS; HOWEVER, THEIR DESIGNATION WOULD FORCES FOR THE ATLANTIC COMMAND AND THUS ACTUALLY PERFORM SOME OF THE FUNCTIONS OF CINCLANT'S COMPONENT COMMANDERS. THEREFORE THE JCS ACTION WILL DO LITTLE MORE THAN FORMALIZE PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY INVOLVED. IT WILL NOT SERVE TO IMPROVE OR EXPEDITE APPRECIABLY THE PLANNING FOR THE AREAS DESIGNATED.

> "3. IN THE INTEREST OF IMPROVING THE READINESS OF U.S. FORCES FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE JCS RECONSIDER CINCLANT'S REQUEST FOR ACTIVATION OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMPONENTS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMAND. PENDING ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS THE JCS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER

THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL DUTY AS COMPONENT COMMANDERS TO COMMANDING GENERAL CONTINENTIAL ARMY COMMAND AND COMMANDER TACTICAL AIR COMMAND. SCP-2.

SCP-2.

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